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ABSTRACT 
“Allied Unshackling: British, Canadian, American Prisoner of War Diplomacy during the 
Shackling Reprisals, 1942-43” 
Kiera Bridley 
Master of Arts in History  
Minnesota State University, Mankato, May 2014. 
 
 
 
 Prisoner of war studies have largely focused their research on the experiences of 
the men and women within their captor countries.  Although some country-specific work 
has been done regarding prisoner of war policy, there has been a significant gap in 
research regarding prisoner of war policy during the Second World War.  This research 
focuses on the convergence of prisoner of war policy and diplomatic relations between 
Great Britain, Canada, and the United States during the shackling reprisals with Germany 
from 1942-43.  The shackling reprisals represented the first conjunction of the three 
nations in diplomatic relations with Germany over the issue of prisoner of war policy.  In 
addition, as the first instance of prisoner of war diplomacy with Germany for both the 
United States and Canada, the shackling reprisals signified the entrance of the Canadian 
and United States governments into prisoner of war diplomacy with Germany during the 
Second World War.  The shackling of prisoners of war became a source of tension 
between the Allies because of the nature of each nation’s role in the incident and 
conflicting perspectives of the three governments on the issue.  Through the examination 
of the Canadian, British, and United States’ foreign correspondence, domestic and 
individual leaders’ accounts, as well as the provisions of the prisoner of war conventions 
in effect at the time, a detailed analysis of the interaction of the three governments over 
prisoner of war policy and diplomacy during the shackling reprisals will be 
accomplished.  During the shackling reprisals, prisoner of war policy was based on the 
relationships between the British, Canadian, and United States governments, individual 
leaders and their respective interests.  This work adds yet another dimension to the 
fragmentary field of prisoner of war and military history by focusing on the top tiers of 
British, Canadian, and United States military and government, ultimately fueling further 
research in international POW studies. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
A prisoner of war is a man who tries to kill you and fails, and then asks 
you not to kill him. 
-Winston Churchill 
 
 
 
 Winston Churchill’s sentiment on the uncertain fate of prisoners of war succinctly 
describes the experiences of captured soldiers, the need for the establishment of 
international regulations for the treatment of prisoners of war, and the cause for the 
periodic revision of those policies.  In 1949, the international community updated and 
revised the 1929 Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War as a result of 
regulatory and treatment issues that arose during the Second World War.  Prisoners of 
war were vulnerable to their host nations during the Second World War, and their 
treatment depended largely on the individual nations holding them.  Captor nations faced 
questions regarding the various aspects of holding prisoners of war while also managing 
their domestic and foreign policies.  Broad regulations on the issues of food, housing, and 
treatment of prisoners of war could be interpreted within a wide margin and became 
sensitive to the sentiment of their captors.  Discrepancies in treatment, when in 
accordance with the Geneva Convention, were rarely of international concern.  In 
situations where the treatment of prisoners of war bordered on breaking regulation, or 
outright violated policy, the international community took interest and attempted to 
mediate the issue.  At this point, the treatment of prisoners of war depended on the 
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policies created through international diplomacy.  Prisoners of war were vulnerable to 
both their captors and the international diplomatic maneuvers that created the policy 
regulating their treatment. 
 One of the first major crises in international prisoner of war policy occurred 
between Nazi Germany and the Allied nations in the fall of 1942 over an interpretation of 
the 1929 Geneva Convention.  A dispute over the ability of captors to bind the hands of 
enemy prisoners of war on the battlefield resulted in the shackling crisis, which lasted 
until December 1943, when the last prisoners of war were unshackled.  As Germany, 
Britain, and Canada engaged in the illegal retaliatory shackling of prisoners of war, the 
leaders of Britain, Canada, and the United States sought to end Allied participation in the 
shackling of prisoners of war and to regain Germany’s compliance with the Geneva 
Convention.  The shackling reprisals became a source of tension between Canada, 
Britain, and the United States because of their conflicting perspectives on appropriate 
action, level of involvement in terms of prisoners of war affected, and the three nations’ 
future in the war against Nazi Germany.  As a result of their differing wartime and 
national objectives, individual national interests and beliefs, the relations of individual 
leaders with one another, and the status of each nation during that time in the war, the 
shackling crisis resulted in conflict amongst Britain, Canada, and the United States over 
Allied prisoner of war policy.  The shackling reprisals demonstrated the frailty of 
prisoner of war regulations and how easily diverse objectives and sentiments influenced 
the treatment of prisoners of war during the Second World War among the Allies.   
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 Many dimensions of inter-Allied relations during the Second World War have 
been examined by historians, including the shackling reprisals and prisoner of war policy.  
However, the intersection of the British, Canadian, and American prisoner of war 
diplomatic policies during the shackling reprisals has yet to be examined in a single 
study.  The unique relationship between the three nations between 1942 and 1943 during 
this key point in international prisoner of war relations during the Second World War 
provides a greater understanding of the challenges that the Allies faced developing a 
combined military strategy and in international prisoner of war diplomacy.  The complex 
interchange of international relations is a necessary addition to scholarship on the Second 
World War, because it allows for a greater understanding of prisoner of war diplomatic 
relations between the belligerents and Allies involved in the shackling reprisals. 
 The Allies’ combined military effort at Dieppe leading to the shackling reprisals 
has been chronicled in numerous works of military history.  From this approach, the 
Dieppe Raid’s significance lies in its failure as a military excursion.  Brian Loring Villa 
takes a multinational approach to the military failure of the Dieppe Raid and focuses on 
the elements that contributed to the tactical disaster at Dieppe.1  David Bercuson and 
Robert W. Black’s respective histories of the Canadian and American Rangers’ 
engagements in the Second World War include analyses of the troop movements and 
battle plans of the Dieppe Raid as they related to later battles and combat in the European 
                                                 
1
 Brian Loring Villa, Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid. (Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 1989). 
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Theatre.2  Military histories focus on the excursion and its role as a precedent to the 1944 
invasion of Europe, as is the case of William Breuer’s Operation Torch: The Allied 
Gamble to Invade North Africa.  Breuer details the chronology of the joint military 
campaign in North Africa and its role as a precedent for the invasion of Europe.3  
Military history’s inclusion of prisoners of war is largely limited to casualty reports of the 
Dieppe Raid.  The shackling reprisals resulted from action and orders from the military 
raids at Dieppe and Sark, but the events have yet to be analyzed together in a work of 
military history.  Prisoners of war and international diplomacy are covered more 
extensively in diplomatic and political scholarship. 
 Studies on Britain, Canada, and the United States’ foreign policy document the 
nations’ involvement in prisoner of war issues and prisoner of war diplomacy during the 
Second World War.  Comprehensive studies of Canadian and British wartime objectives 
by C.P. Stacey and Jonathan Vance explain the conflict between Canada and Britain 
regarding the status and roles of dominions as well as their differing wartime agendas.4  
Such comprehensive scholarship is able to demonstrate the context of relations in which 
the retaliation controversy of 1942 occurred, but neglects to address the shackling crisis 
                                                 
2
 David Bercuson, Maple Leaf Against the Axis: Canada’s Second World War (Toronto: Stoddart, 
1995); Robert W. Black, The Ranger Force: Darby’s Rangers in World War II (Mechanicsburg, PA: 
Stackpole Books, 2009). 
 
3
 William B. Breuer, Operation Torch: The Allied Gamble to Invade North Africa (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1985). 
 
4
 C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: 
Queen’s Printer, 1970); Jonathan F. Vance, Maple Leaf Empire: Canada, Britain, and Two World Wars 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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and prisoner of war policy in detail.  Jonathan Vance’s article “Men in Manacles: The 
Shackling of Prisoners of War, 1942-1943” provides a more focused analysis of the 
incident in terms of British-Canadian relations which, in addition to S.P. MacKenzie’s 
analysis of the prisoner of war diplomacy of the shackling reprisals, demonstrates the 
British-Canadian political dynamics during the incident.5  The bilateral prisoner of war 
relations analyzed in these studies excludes the diplomatic role of United States.  
Likewise, scholarship on the United States’ foreign policy separates the United States 
from its interlaced role with the Allies.  Robert Dalleck’s comprehensive examination of 
United States foreign policy during Franklin Roosevelt’s tenure as president is exclusive 
of other Allies’ foreign policies as a result of this perspective.6  The foreign policies of 
Britain, Canada, and the United States during the Second World War have been covered 
extensively as individual and bilateral studies.  The triumvirate of prisoner of war 
interests during the shackling reprisals has yet to be examined, and thus represents a 
neglected aspect of Allied diplomatic history. 
 The treatment of prisoners of war by the United States, Britain, and Canada has 
fallen into two primary categories of scholarship: examinations of the prisoners’ 
conditions and analyses of the motivations behind captors’ treatment of prisoners.  
Historiography for prisoner of war diplomacy during the shackling reprisals consists 
                                                 
5
 Jonathan F. Vance, “Men in Manacles: The Shackling of Prisoners of War, 1942-1943,” Journal of 
Military History 59, no. 3 (July 1995): 483-504; S.P. MacKenzie, “The Shackling Crisis: A Case-Study in 
the Dynamics of Prisoner-of-War Diplomacy in the Second World War,” International History Review 17, 
no. 1 (February 1995): 78-98. 
 
6
 Robert Dalleck, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995). 
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primarily of individual national histories of British, Canadian, and American internment 
of prisoners of war and overarching themes in prisoner of war policy history.  In the 
edited volume Prisoners-of-War and Their Captors in World War II, the individual 
analyses of captor nations demonstrates that the domestic political considerations of 
captor nations became the main influence in determining the treatment of prisoners of 
war.7  S.P. MacKenzie’s article on this topic also demonstrates how the prisoner of war 
policies adopted by captors were tied to ideological perspectives as well as practical 
motives.8  These studies demonstrate the international trends in prisoner of war policy 
that influenced the management of Britain, Canada, and the United States’ leaders during 
the shackling reprisals.  These individual analyses and overarching themes fail to address 
specific international diplomatic relations regarding prisoner of war diplomacy and 
policy.  Research on the interchange of diplomacy between Britain, Canada, and the 
United States during the shackling reprisals has a foundation in these studies, but requires 
a more specific study in order to grasp the complexities of this individual event. 
 The individual nations’ domestic conditions have been examined in relation to the 
development of prisoner of war treatment of policy, supplementing the overarching 
studies of prisoner of war policy during the Second World War.  J. Anthony Hellen and 
Bob Moore provide articles that examine British domestic politics and its influence on 
                                                 
7
 Kent Fedorowich and Bob Moore, eds., Prisoners-of-War and Their Captors in World War II 
(Oxford: Berg, 1996). 
 
8
 S.P. MacKenzie, “The Treatment of Prisoners of War in World War II,” Journal of Modern History 
66, no. 3 (September 1994): 487-520. 
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the treatment of prisoners of war, both arguing that British prisoner of war policies were 
dictated by Britain’s military and political needs as well as the nationality of the prisoners 
of war more often than by the Geneva Convention.9  Studies on Canadian prisoner of war 
policy have primarily focused on the experience of prisoners of war in Canadian prisoner 
of war camps.10  Likewise, a great deal of scholarship has been dedicated to the 
experiences of prisoners of war in the United States rather than the policy that influenced 
their treatment.11  Altogether, studies on Allied prisoners of war have focused on 
individual regions and the experiences of prisoners of war and fail to examine the 
international diplomatic relations that resulted in the shackling of prisoners of war during 
the shackling reprisals.  An analysis of the British, American, and Canadian prisoner of 
war diplomacy during the shackling reprisals has yet to be addressed in the 
historiography of prisoners of war during the Second World War. 
                                                 
9
 J. Anthony Hellen, “Temporary Settlements and Transient Populations: The Legacy of Britain’s 
Prisoner of War Camps: 1940-1948,” Erdkunde 53, no. 3 (July-September 1999): 191-219; Bob Moore, 
“Turning Liabilities into Assets: British Government Policy Towards German and Italian Prisoners of War 
during the Second World War,” Journal of Contemporary History 32, no. 1 (January 1997): 117-136. 
 
10
 Martin F. Auger, Prisoners of the Home Front (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005); Daniels, Roger and 
Kay Saunders, eds., Alien Justice: Wartime Internment in Australia and North America (St. Lucia, 
Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 2000); John Melady, Escape from Canada! The Untold Story 
of German POWs in Canada, 1939-1945 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1981); Bill Waiser, Park Prisoners: The 
Untold Story of Western Canada’s National Parks, 1915-1946 (Saskatoos, Sask.: Fifth House Publishers, 
1995); John Joseph Kelly, The Prisoner of War Camps in Canada, 1939-1947 (master’s thesis, University 
of Windsor, 1976); Chris Mark Vedel Madsen, German Prisoners of War in Canada during the Second 
World War (unpublished master’s thesis, University of Western Ontario, 1992). 
 
11
 Antonio Thompson, Men in German Uniform: POWs in American during World War II (Knoxville: 
University of Tennessee Press, 2010); Arnold Krammer, “German Prisoners of War in the United States,” 
Military Affairs 40, no. 2 (April 1976): 68-73. 
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 In research on the shackling reprisals, biographies of the leaders of Britain, 
Canada, and the United States must be taken into account because of the influence which 
individual leaders had on prisoner of war policy and diplomatic relations.  Individual 
biographies of Winston Churchill, William Lyon Mackenzie King, and Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt have been written that reveal the personal traits, influences, and beliefs of each 
man during their leadership in the Second World War.12  In addition, dual and triad 
biographies of Allied leaders focus on the relationships and conflicts between the 
‘greater’ leaders of the Allies: France, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union.13  
The relationships between Churchill, Mackenzie King, and Roosevelt have yet to be 
studied in one work, just as their relationships in context of national and international 
situations has yet to be considered.  Because of the instrumental influence of these three 
leaders on the diplomacy during the shackling reprisals, it is necessary to analyze the 
shackling reprisals with consideration for the involvement and influence of Britain, 
Canada, and the United States’ individual leaders. 
 Previous scholarship provides a foundation for this research as contextual matter.  
Allied relations and prisoner of war policies have been studied in numerous contexts, but 
                                                 
12
 Norman Rose, Churchill: An Unruly Life (London: Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2009).; J. Granatstein, 
Mackenzie King: His Life and World (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1977), 146; Allan Levine, King: 
William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Life Guided by the Hand of Destiny (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 
2011).; Conrad Black, Franklin Delano Roosevelt: Champion of Freedom (New York: Public Affairs, 
2003). 
 
13
 Simon Berthon, Allies at War: The Bitter Rivalry Among Churchill, Roosevelt, and de Gaulle (New 
York: Carroll & Graf, 2001); David Stafford, Roosevelt and Churchill: Men of Secrets (Woodstock, NY: 
Overlook Press, 2000); Remi Nadeua, Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt Divided Europe (Santa Barbara, 
CA: Praeger, 1990); Jon Meacham, Franklin and Winston: An Intimate Portrait of an Epic Friendship 
(Toronto: Random House, 2003); Warren F. Kimball, Forged in War: Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Second 
World War (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1997). 
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not in an effort to understand the larger relationship behind Canada, Britain, and the 
United States and their leaders that influenced prisoner of war policies.  Through 
pinpointing this pivotal time in prisoner of war diplomacy during the Second World War 
and analyzing the convergence of United States, Britain, and Canada in international 
prisoner of war policy, this research provides a comparative study on the shackling 
reprisals that fills in many gaps in many fields of scholarship. 
 This study is organized chronologically, with one chapter devoted to each 
significant development in the shackling reprisals.  Chapter I outlines the provisions for 
the treatment of prisoners of war and bodies responsible for mediating conflicts regarding 
policy disputes between belligerent powers.  This chapter analyzes the foundation of 
prisoner of war diplomacy during the Second World War and reveals the ideal and 
intended arbitration methods intended to be used for events like that of the shackling 
reprisals.  Chapter 2 analyzes the Dieppe and Sark raids in the context of Britain, Canada, 
and the United States’ trilateral military and diplomatic entrance into the European 
Theatre.  In addition, it provides a chronology of the events leading up to the shackling 
reprisals. 
 Chapters 3 and 4 encompass the diplomacy between the United States, Canada, 
and Britain during the extent of the shackling reprisals.  The shackling reprisals are 
separated into two segments: October through December 1942 and January through 
December 1943.  Chapter 3 is dedicated to the fall of 1942, which analyzes the period of 
time German prisoners of war in Britain and Canada were shackled and as diplomatic 
10 
 
 
 
relations between the three nations were largely in the hands of the nations’ individual 
leaders.  Within the chapter, the British-Canadian and American aspects are addressed in 
two parts from the perspective of the nations’ leaders.  This reflects the nature of 
diplomacy during the shackling reprisals at this time.  Chapter 4 continues the chronology 
from a universal and intertwined perspective as Britain and Canada ended their 
involvement in retaliatory shackling, the British, Canadian, and American governments 
took over the diplomatic relations, and the urgency of the shackling reprisals faded.  The 
Conclusion closes this research with analysis on the trilateral development of prisoner of 
war policy between the United States, Canada, and Britain during the shackling reprisals 
and its impact on the revision of the 1949 Geneva Convention. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 Precedents  
 
 
 
 International prisoner of war policy during the Second World War was 
determined by the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War for those nations signatory.  Britain, Canada, the United States, and Germany were 
among those nations, and so their actions were theoretically regulated by international 
policy.  As leaders of the Allied war effort in the North African and European Theatres 
by 1942, the British, Canadians, and Americans became the leading nations involved in 
prisoner of war policy with Germany.14  In addition, during the course of the war these 
three nations remained unoccupied by Germany and “were the three countries which had 
the vast majority of German servicemen in captivity, ensuring…the attention of the 
German government.”15  These factors made the three nations unique in their relation to 
German prisoner of war treatment and policy and together distinguish their roles in the 
shackling reprisals. 
 As the forefront of Allied prisoner of war diplomatic relations and policy at the 
time, the United States, Britain, and Canada’s relative adherence to the 1929 Geneva 
Convention demonstrated the circumstantial developments that made national policy 
                                                 
14
 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, International 
Humanitarian Law—Treaties and Documents, accessed January 14, 2014, http://www.icrc.org. 
 
15
 Vasilis Vourkoutiotis, “The German Armed Forces Supreme Command and British and American 
Prisoners-of-war, 1939-1945: Policy and Practice” (PhD diss., McGill University, 2000), 4. 
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differ from international regulations.  The shackling reprisals represented a prisoner of 
war treatment and policy crisis that had regulatory precedents in place meant to prevent 
the escalation of such a situation, but the individual belligerents’ failure to utilize these 
measures resulted in the preventable escalation of hostilities.  In order to assess the 
shackling reprisals in terms of converging Allied prisoner of war policy, it is necessary to 
analyze the regulations in place that were intended to manage prisoner of war treatment 
and conflicts regarding prisoner of war policy as well as the conditions that made the 
United States, Canada, and Britain unique in their relation to German prisoners of war. 
 Regulations on the conduct of the Allies during the Second World War included 
both aspects of international humanitarian law in effect at the time: the 1907 Hague Rules 
of Land Warfare and the 1929 Geneva Convention.  All belligerents during the shackling 
reprisals were signatories of these conventions, thus binding them to the modern 
conventions of prisoner of war treatment.  Humanitarian regulations for the conduct of 
war during Second World War were based on a principle “distinction between 
combatants and civilians, the requirement that wounded and captured enemy combatants 
must be treated humanely, and that quarter must be given.”16  The 1907 Hague 
Convention and the 1929 Geneva Convention included provisions for the humane 
treatment of prisoners of war and laid out the regulations for the captor government for 
                                                 
16
 Dieter Fleck, ed. Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 20. 
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the treatment of prisoners of war.17  This universal policy provided a basis for the 
signatories regarding their handling of prisoners of war, although during the duration of 
the Second World War these regulations would be tested, bent, and broken in a variety of 
ways.  The United States, Britain, and Canada’s collective experience with German 
prisoners of war was based on the foundations of international humanitarian law in place 
during the Second World War.   
 The 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War stood 
as the primary regulation on prisoner of war diplomacy and treatment during the Second 
World War.  The regulations outlined in the 1929 Geneva Convention served as an 
update to the 1907 Hague Convention on the laws and customs of war on land, providing 
significant additions regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, which had previously 
been limited to the definitions and roles of captors and prisoners of war.18  One of the 
most significant additions in the 1929 Geneva Convention was in Article 2, the addition 
stating: “They [prisoners of war] must at all times be humanely treated and protected, 
particularly against acts of violence, insults and public curiosity.  Measures of reprisal 
against them are prohibited.”19  The problem with the vagueness of this article became 
                                                 
17
 Additional Declaration II: Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land,  1899 
Hague Convention, on Laws and Customs of War on Land, included provisions from the Geneva 
Convention of 1864, accessed January 14, 2014, http://www.icrc.org.; Laws of War: Laws and Customs of 
War on Land (Hague II), July 29, 1899, Ibid.; 1929 Geneva Convention, Ibid.  
 
18
 Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV): October 18, 1907, accessed January 
14, 2014, http://www.icrc.org. 
 
19
 Convention Between the United States of American and Other Powers, Relating to Prisoners of War; 
July 27, 1929, accessed January 14, 2014, http://www.icrc.org. 
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apparent during the Second World War, as was the case in the shackling reprisals.  The 
definition of humane was disputed, as will be discussed later, and served as a point of 
tension not only between the Allied and Axis forces, but among the Allies themselves.   
The problematic nature of the “humane” cited in Article 2 of the 1929 Convention was 
elaborated upon in its successor in 1949, thus demonstrating that there had been a general 
issue with the vague definition and its ability to be interpreted differently by the 
belligerents of the Second World War.  The shackling reprisals of 1942-43 began as a 
result of this exact issue and would only be resolved once the opposing powers came to 
their own compromise. 
 Diplomatic relations between the Allies and Nazi Germany were overseen by the 
regulations of the 1929 Geneva Convention, which established the role of a Protecting 
Power.  The Protecting Power was, and remains, “a state which has accepted the 
responsibility of protecting interests of another state in the territory of a third, with which, 
for some reason, such as war, the second state does not maintain diplomatic relations.”20  
The 1929 Geneva Convention established the role of the Protecting Power as well as their 
role in the management of prisoner of war treatment.  The Protecting Power was 
responsible for representing prisoners of war, and agents were supposed to be available 
for appointment wherever there were prisoners of war as an intermediary between the 
prisoners of war, military authorities, and the Protecting Power.21  The importance of the 
                                                 
20
 United States Foreign Service Manual. Vol. 2. Consular Affairs, July 13, 1955. Paragraph 923.31-2.; 
Articles 43 and 44, 1929 Geneva Convention, Ibid. 
 
21
 Article 43, 1929 Geneva Convention. 
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Protecting Power in prisoner of war diplomacy was significant, as it served as both a 
representative for prisoners of war and as a mediator between belligerents.   
Article 87 of the 1929 Geneva Convention was a provision intended to manage cases 
where belligerents disagreed over the provisions of the Geneva Convention, as in the case 
of the shackling reprisals.22   
In the case of disagreement between the belligerents as to the application 
of the provisions of the present convention, the protecting Powers must, in 
so far as possible, lend their good offices for the purpose of settling the 
difference.  For this purpose, each of the protecting Powers may, in 
particular, suggest to the interested belligerents a meeting of 
representatives thereof, possibly upon a neutral territory suitably chosen.  
Belligerents shall be bound to accede U [sic] proposals in this sense which 
are made to them.  The protecting Power may, if occasion arises, submit 
for the approval of the Powers concerned a person belonging to a neutral 
Power or a person delegated by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, who shall be summoned to take part in this meeting.23   
 
The 1929 Geneva Convention provided a fail-safe for the shackling reprisals, where 
earlier provisions and articles could be disputed between belligerents.  In the case of the 
shackling reprisals, it should be noted that the use of the Protecting Power was limited by 
Britain’s choice.  This dynamic of the prisoner of war diplomacy will be examined in 
greater detail later. 
 The legislation that created the Protecting Power was first implemented and tested 
during the Second World War, where the institution of Protecting Power was recognized 
as the official institution responsible for safeguarding of belligerent nations’ interests.  
Most of the belligerents of the war had a Protecting Power representative, with the 
                                                 
22
 Article 87, Ibid. 
 
23
 Ibid. 
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exception of the USSR and Japan, countries that had not signed the 1929 Geneva 
Convention.24  Because there were very few neutral parties in relation to the number of 
nations involved in the Second World War, problems with the institution arose.  The 
selection of a Protecting Power was limited to the few neutral countries and so often a 
Protecting Power represented two opposing belligerent nations.25  In addition, because 
“there was no large neutral world public opinion to be affected by violations of the 
convention, and the power of neutral public opinion in forcing compliance with a 
humanitarian convention cannot be overestimated,” the power of the Protecting Power 
was inadvertently limited.26  Switzerland, the Protecting Power for many of the 
belligerents on both sides of the Second World War, was however able to “obtain a 
general observance of the law of war by each belligerent on the basis of reciprocity.”27  
As the Protecting Power for up to thirty-five states at one point during the war, 
Switzerland represented all sides during the shackling reprisals.  As a result of its 
representation of both Germany and the Allies, the Swiss government found limited 
success in both diplomatic mediation and enforcement of prisoner of war policy during 
the shackling reprisals. 
                                                 
24
 Leslie C. Green and Michael N. Schmidt, “Prisoners of War and the Protecting Power,” American 
Journal of International Law 70 (1961): 32.  
 
25
 Ibid., 33.  
 
26
 Ibid. 
 
27
 William McHenry Franklin, Protection of Foreign Interests: A Study in Diplomatic and Consular 
Practice (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), 228; Green and Schmidt, “Prisoners 
of War and the Protecting Power,” 34-5.  
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 The International Committee of the Red Cross supplemented the role of the 
Protecting Power in the shackling reprisals and other prisoner of war conflicts during the 
Second World War.  The International Committee of the Red Cross claims responsibility 
for the implementation of a prisoner of war convention during the interwar period, the 
result being the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War.28  Thus, the role of the International Committee of the Red Cross in relation to 
wartime actions was included within the 1929 Geneva Convention.  The organization’s 
humanitarian activities were not to be impeded by articles of the convention, giving the 
International Committee of the Red Cross the ability to maneuver outside of the 
regulations of the convention.29  The role of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross often overlapped with that of the Protecting Power when it came to prisoners of 
war, and the organization often had to work against an attitude that they were duplicating 
the role of the Protecting Power, and thus were not needed in prisoner of war camps.30  
Because the International Committee of the Red Cross paid regular visits to prisoner of 
war camps and inspected the prisoners’ health, accommodation, and quality of food in 
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addition to taking complaints about treatment of prisoners of war, the organization 
became vital link between governments and their prisoners of war. 
 The 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War had 
provisions dictating not only the appropriate treatment of prisoners of war, but the paths 
to take should a disagreement over the convention arise.  The convention included 
provisions validating the roles of the Protecting Power and the International Red Cross so 
that belligerent powers could “learn what was occurring in the enemy's prisoner-of-war 
camps and, when necessary, engage in indirect negotiations.”31  As signatories of the 
treaty, Germany, Britain, Canada, and the United States were held to its provisions and its 
diplomatic proceedings.  The established roles of the Protecting Power and the 
International Red Cross were intended to prevent incidents such as the shackling 
reprisals.  However, this required the belligerent powers to follow the proceedings 
outlined in the Geneva Convention.  Of the involved powers, the United States was the 
only disassociated party abiding by the prisoner of war regulations during the shackling 
reprisals.  Although all signatories of the 1929 Geneva Convention assured the 
International Red Cross that they would abide by the convention in September 1939 and 
for the most part operated under the basic assumption that prisoners of war were human 
beings and deserved to be treated as such, the protocols of the convention were often 
interpreted by individual nations according to their own needs.32  The shackling reprisals 
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of 1942-43 were the result of such interpretation intermixing with the interests of 
individual nations and their leaders. 
 As unoccupied nations, Britain, Canada, and the United States had varying 
degrees of disassociation from the fighting that contributed to their collective experience 
with the shackling reprisals.  This was a greater factor in the United States and Canada 
with the Atlantic Ocean as a separation from Nazi Germany, whereas Britain faced 
Germany across the English Channel early on in the war.  The relative separation from 
the war-front was instrumental in the treatment of and holding of prisoners of war.  One 
of the most convincing arguments for this comes from a comparison of the treatment of 
German prisoners of war by France and Britain following the war—the treatment by 
French captors was affected by Nazi Germany’s occupation of the country during the 
war, resulting in some of the worst treatment of German prisoners of war by an Allied 
nation.33  The distance from the immediacy of the war influenced the behavior and 
mindset of the United States, Canada, and Britain during the shackling reprisals in 
varying degrees, but with a universal positive trend.  German prisoners of war held by the 
United States and Britain had respective casualty rates of .15% and .03%, whereas the 
rate for German prisoners of war held by France was 2.58%.34  Canada, Britain, and the 
United States’ unoccupied status had an even greater influence on their treatment of 
German prisoners of war; once again, in a comparison with France, where cases of severe 
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violations of the Geneva Convention were reported, it is evident that the unoccupied 
status of its three Allied nations significantly affected their treatment of German prisoners 
of war.35 
 Britain, Canada, and the United States’ isolation from the fighting during the 
Second World War in both the European and Pacific Theatres directly influenced the 
Allied decision to hold German prisoners of war in those countries.  Early in the war, 
Britain and the Soviet Union held the vast majority of German prisoners of war.  The 
British government dispersed them throughout the Commonwealth due to the potential 
threat of German prisoners in Britain and the lack of space in the British Isles.  Canada, 
New Zealand, and Australia were selected to hold the German and Italian prisoners of 
war taken by British forces because of their dominion statuses.  The transfer of German 
prisoners of war to the United States occurred later in the war, following the United 
States’ entrance into the war and its eventual agreement to house prisoners taken by 
Britain.36  Britain, Canada, and the United States’ dedication to housing German 
prisoners of war attracted attention from Germany.  The potential repercussions from this 
attention influenced their interest and involvement in the shackling reprisals.  As would 
prove true during the shackling reprisals, housing German prisoners of war increased a 
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nations’ potential of becoming involved in a diplomatic crisis over the respective 
treatment of prisoners of war. 
 The involvement of the United States, Britain, and Canada in the shackling 
reprisals was a direct result of their signatory status to the 1929 Geneva Convention, as 
unoccupied nations, and as the holders of the majority of German prisoners of war during 
the Second World War.  The Canadian, British, and American triumvirate created during 
the shackling reprisals reflected the prisoner of war conditions of the war prior to and 
during the shackling reprisals in addition to the power dynamics of the Allies during the 
entirety of the war.  As such, it is necessary to address the wartime leaders of these three 
nations as agents of diplomacy during the shackling reprisals. The individuals leading the 
nations at war were instrumental not only to the development of war, but also the 
diplomatic proceedings that occurred as a result of war.  Britain, Canada, and the United 
States’ individual leaders, national interests, and degree of involvement with German 
prisoners had significant influence on the diplomatic process during the shackling 
reprisals.  These elements intertwined, taking on varying levels of importance throughout 
the crisis as the three nations responded to German diplomacy and threats.
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Chapter 2 
Dieppe and Sark 
 
 
 
 The shackling reprisals began with the Dieppe Raid on August 19, 1942, when the 
hand-tying of German prisoners of war gained international attention and provoked 
Germany to respond.  In addition to its importance in the chronology of the shackling 
reprisals, the Dieppe Raid signified the origination of the United States, Britain, and 
Canada’s collective prisoner of war diplomatic front against Germany.  The Dieppe Raid 
was the first collaborative military excursion between the three nations in the European 
Theatre and signified the entrance of both Canada and the United States into prisoner of 
war relations with Germany.  The political and military elements of the Dieppe and Sark 
Raids provides context for why the shackling reprisals were important to all three nations.  
Additionally, it also explains their individual interests and gradations of involvement in 
the prisoner of war diplomatic crisis. 
 Prior to the United States’ official entrance into the Second World War, President 
Roosevelt met with Prime Minister Churchill to discuss the possible courses of action if 
the United States entered the war.  In March 1941 at the ABC-1 Conference, the United 
States and Britain agreed that their strategic objectives were to defeat Germany first 
while maintaining a strategic defense of the Pacific Theatre.37  Following the United 
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States’ entrance into the Second World War on the side of the Allies, American 
diplomats began official discussions with their British counterparts regarding the plan for 
defeating the Axis powers.  The United States continued to support the Europe First 
strategy and reassured Britain that “Germany was the main enemy and that the major 
effort would be made initially in Europe.”38  By the spring of 1942, the European front 
had moved westward to the English Channel.  Germany controlled northern and eastern 
France, leaving the English Channel as Britain’s only physical barrier from German 
troops.  With this immediate threat at hand, preparation for the use of Canadian and 
American forces in the European Theatre began.  For this reason, Canadian and 
American forces began preparation for their maiden voyage into combat with the Nazis in 
Europe.   
 The Allies planned for a British-American cross-channel invasion of German-
occupied France in 1943, which required not only American forces to be concentrated in 
England, but also for the American troops to gain battle experience in order to 
supplement their training.39  With this in mind, the Rangers had been formed and those 
Canadian units training in Britain began preparation for combat.  In preparation for the 
collective British, Canadian, and American military effort in the European Theatre, the 
Allied governments decided that a major raid should be staged on the French port of 
Dieppe in 1942.  With this attack, the Allies sought to demonstrate their strength and 
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presence to the German high command, as well as divert attention away from the Allied 
invasion of North Africa.  The Dieppe Raid, code-named Operation Jubilee, also tested 
the coordination of the Allies in a large-scale military operation and an evaluation of new 
techniques and equipment.  The Canadians and Americans first saw combat in the 
European Theatre during the Dieppe Raid, an assault that also served as a test of the 
Rangers’ training and combat readiness.  A raid on the coastal city of Dieppe served 
several purposes: 
To gain the preinvasion experience of putting a large body of men and 
equipment, including tanks, ashore under air and sea covering fires; to test 
the enemy response; and to learn how fast he could rise to the challenge, 
and hopefully, give the appearance of helping the Russians by causing the 
Germans to worry about their western defense and draw off some forces 
from the Russian front.  There was also concern about Allied morale.  
Something in the nature of offensive action needed to be done to bring 
ground war in Western Europe to the Germans.40  
 
The Canadian 2nd Division, in England since 1940, was an obvious choice for the mission 
because a limited number of British troops were available and the Canadians had been 
training in England in anticipation for such an opportunity.41  Likewise, the Rangers were 
readily available, but had trained for a significantly shorter amount of time.  At President 
Roosevelt’s demand, the plans for a raid on Dieppe included American forces in order to 
test the Rangers and to increase the American public’s morale.42   
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 The initial raid was planned for July, but rescheduled for August 19, 1942 due to 
weather conditions.  Operation Jubilee included five thousand Canadian troops, one 
thousand British Commandos, and fifty American Rangers, creating a triumvirate of 
forces.43  The American role in Dieppe was relatively minor, with only fifty Rangers 
selected to participate in the fighting at Dieppe.44  The inclusion of the American Rangers 
was primarily political, intended to raise American morale regarding the war through the 
participation of American troops in the European Theatre.  Canadian troops first fought in 
the European Theatre during the Dieppe Raid, where they made up the majority of the 
fighting force and casualties.  The Canadian government’s interest in prisoner of war 
relations with Germany increased dramatically as a result of their involvement in the 
Dieppe Raid.  The combination of British, Canadian, and American forces at Dieppe was 
the first of its kind in the European Theatre of the Second World War.  As a result, the 
Dieppe Raid became much more than the Allies had planned for: a diplomatic crisis over 
the shackling of prisoners of war. 
 At 18:30 on August 18, 1942, Allied forces set across the English Channel in 
landing crafts towards the German-occupied port city of Dieppe, France as a part of 
Operation Jubilee.  The raiding force intended to seize and hold the Dieppe port for a 
short period of time, proving that it was possible, to gather intelligence, and upon leaving, 
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to destroy strategic buildings, port structures, and German coastal defenses.  As the 
product of the Combined Operations Headquarters, Operation Jubilee consisted of three 
points of attack: a frontal assault by the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division on the town and 
two flanking assaults by the Number 3 and 4 British Commandos with American Rangers 
dispersed throughout the British and Canadian units.45  Operation Jubilee planned for the 
stealthy landing of troops on a ten mile stretch of the French coast at Dieppe.  However, 
at 03:46 on August 19, a convoy of German torpedo boats escorting a German tanker 
unintentionally intercepted the assault force, alerting German defenses around Dieppe, 
sinking several of the Allied landing craft.46  This divergence from the strategy of the 
Dieppe Raid proved to be disastrous from the immediate military standpoint and from the 
subsequent diplomatic consequences. 
  The frontal assault comprised of an attack by the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, 
who would land on four of the six beaches in front of the town.  This plan relied not only 
on the element of surprise for the main assault, but on its ability to allow the flanking 
units to neutralize some of the more significant German defenses at Dieppe.47 With 
limited air support and insufficient armored capability on the beaches, the troops were 
pinned on the beach by German machine gun and grenade fire.  As a result, they were 
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unable to make it to the town as planned.48 Casualties were enormous, with 3,367 of the 
5,000 Canadian killed, wounded, or taken prisoner.49 The flanking maneuvers by the 
British Commandos and United States Rangers were slightly more successful, but also 
resulted in exceptionally high casualty rates.  A total of 1,874 Canadian, eighty-seven 
British, and four United States soldiers were taken as prisoners of war at Dieppe, creating 
a new dimension of interaction for the three nations in their wartime diplomacy with 
Germany.50  
 The Dieppe Raid resulted in massive casualty rates and failed enormously as a 
pre-invasion experiment, but the consequences reached much farther than the immediate 
military action.  One of the Canadians taken prisoner was caught with a copy of the 
Dieppe assault plan, which included a recommendation for the binding of prisoners of 
war “wherever possible…to prevent the destruction of their documents.”51  In addition, 
the German government received reports of dead German soldiers with their hands tied 
washing ashore after the Canadian withdrawal.  Upon receiving news of these purported 
events, the German government threatened to shackle the Allied soldiers taken at Dieppe.  
Britain sent a response denying that the government had issued orders to shackle captured 
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German soldiers.52  Apparently satisfied with this reply, the German threat of shackling 
faded away until October 1942. 
 August 19, 1942 marked the first time that Canadian and United States soldiers 
fought in the European Theatre of the Second World War.  As such, it was also the first 
time that Canadian and United States servicemen were taken as prisoners of war by 
Germany.  Until that point, prisoner of war diplomacy with Germany had an 
unmistakable British accent: Britain was the primary opponent to Nazi Germany, as well 
as the leader of the Allies, and had the greatest prisoner of war ties with Germany 
regarding both captive British and German soldiers.  As a result of the overwhelming 
losses for Allied forces at Dieppe on August 19, 1942, Canada and the United States 
became entangled in prisoner of war diplomacy with Germany.  The Dieppe Raid was 
instrumental in the shackling reprisals as the first excursion of Canadian and U.S. forces, 
along with British, in the European Theatre.  As a result of the casualties at Dieppe, the 
United States and Canada became involved in prisoner of war diplomacy with Germany.  
In addition, it was at Dieppe that the first allegations of hand-tying and mistreatment of 
German prisoners of war by Allied forces were made.  In many ways, August 19, 1942 
became a preface to the shackling reprisals and the prisoner of war policy crises it caused. 
 During the evening hours of October 3, 1942, a British Commando raid called 
Operation Basalt was launched on the German-controlled island of Sark in the Channel 
Islands.  Five German soldiers were captured during the raid and had their hands tied, 
                                                 
52
 Telegram, High Command of the Armed Forces [Adolf Hitler] to the Secretary of the War Cabinet 
[E. E. Bridges], Oct. 10, 1942, Cabinet Papers CAB 66/30/4, The National Archives (TNA). 
 
29 
 
 
 
four of whom were killed while attempting to escape and thus found by the Germans.  
The German military declared that the four dead soldiers were found with their hands 
bound, and German propaganda stated that two had been shot while resisting the hand-
tying, the same procedure used at Dieppe.53  Citing the hand-tying incidents at Dieppe 
and Sark, the German government issued a retaliatory shackling order.  Germany 
announced that a total of 1,376 prisoners of war—107 officers and 1,269 of other rank—
would be shackled on October 7, 1942.54  Germany ordered that Britain must provide 
evidence that they would not shackle prisoners of war in the future and that they could 
maintain control of their soldiers in the future.55  The hand-tying incidents at Dieppe and 
Sark became an international crisis with the German government’s October 7 order.  
Britain, Canada, and the United States became embroiled in the diplomatic crisis, in 
various stages and to various degrees, but were undoubtedly the three Allied nations 
affected the most by the incident. 
 The prisoner of war situation in Britain, Canada, and the United States after the 
Dieppe Raid contributed significantly to their involvement in the shackling reprisals.  
Britain’s ongoing prisoner of war diplomatic relationship with Germany between the 
beginning of the war in September 1939 and October 1942 meant that it assumed a 
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leadership role in prisoner of war diplomatic relations during the shackling reprisals.  
However, although Canada had no prior diplomatic relationship with Germany regarding 
prisoners of war, its investment in the shackling reprisals outweighed Britain’s by far in 
terms of the number of their prisoners of war taken during the Dieppe Raid.  Almost 
2,000 Canadians became prisoners of war during the Dieppe Raid, compared to the 
eighty-seven British prisoners captured.56  In addition, by October 1942, Canada held the 
vast majority of German prisoners of war compared to other Allied nations.  In 
comparison to Britain’s five hundred and Australia’s 1500, Canada held 16,000 German 
prisoners of war.57  Thus, the Canadian government had a significant investment in 
prisoner of war diplomacy with Germany during the shackling reprisals.  Much like 
Canada, the United States first saw its men captured by the Germans during the Dieppe 
Raid.  In comparison, the four United States Rangers who became prisoners of war of 
Germany were hardly significant compared to the 2,000 Canadians taken at Dieppe and 
even the eighty-seven British.58  Despite the numerical insignificance of the four versus 
the compiled number of Canadian and British prisoners of war in Germany at the 
beginning of the shackling reprisals, the symbolic significance of the four American 
Rangers taken prisoner at Dieppe and the potential for future American prisoners of war 
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was enormous.  As such, the United States became an instrumental figure in the shackling 
reprisals.  Together, the leaders of Britain, Canada, and the United States were forced to 
resolve inter-Allied issues before they could properly address the situation with Germany.
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Chapter 3 
 
 October-December, 1942  
 
 
 
British-Canadian Diplomacy, Fall 1942 
 
 
 On October 8, Winston Churchill convened the British war cabinet in order to 
discuss Adolph Hitler’s decision to shackle the prisoners of war taken at Dieppe and the 
demands he had of Britain.  Churchill and the war cabinet admitted to having issued 
orders to tie the hands of captured German soldiers taken at Dieppe so that they could not 
destroy their papers.59  Their formal response to the German government’s telegram 
recanted the British previous denial of involvement in the hand-tying of Germans at 
Dieppe.  Their response included a promise to revoke the order to tie the hands of 
captured German soldiers.60  Churchill did not believe that the hand-tying that had 
occurred broke the parameters of Article 2 because the action itself fit within the 
guidelines of humane treatment.  There was no reference to hand-tying prisoners of war 
in the 1929 Geneva Convention because it applied broad terms to the treatment of 
prisoners of war.  The Germans’ retaliatory act of shackling British and Canadian 
prisoners of war was undeniably a breach of Article 2, which clearly stated that 
“Measures of reprisal against them [prisoners of war] are forbidden.”61  While this was 
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clear, the 1929 Geneva Convention did not contain a regulation on the binding of 
prisoners’ hands on the battlefield.  The closest comparable regulation contained the 
vague order for the humane treatment of prisoners, which did not include specifications 
on the definition of humane or on the tying of prisoners’ hands on or off the battlefield.62  
Churchill did not believe that an admission of guilt was necessary in the matter of tying 
prisoners of war’ hands because it was not specifically mentioned in the Geneva 
Convention.  In the same telegram that rescinded British orders for prisoners of wars’ 
hands to be tied, Churchill declared that Britain was “compelled, in order to protect their 
own prisoners of war, to take similar measures [shackling] upon an equal number of 
enemy [German] prisoners of war.”63  This show of British power was meant to force the 
German government to adhere to the Geneva Conventions regulations of retaliatory acts 
against prisoners of war.  In doing so, Churchill broke the convention as well and created 
tension between the British and Canadian governments. 
 Britain had not consulted Canada before announcing that it would retaliate against 
the German shackling of British and Canadian prisoners of war.  This was not 
unprecedented behavior, as William Lyon Mackenzie King had complained about not 
being consulted on aspects of the Dieppe invasion and for not having approved on aspects 
regarding the participation of the Canadian 2nd Infantry Divisions.64  Mackenzie King 
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supported Britain with Canada’s entrance into the war and had continued to support the 
British war effort through primarily non-military industrial and financial means. Canada 
was a British dominion, but Mackenzie King had refused to place a representative in the 
British war cabinet in order to maintain Canadian independence.  Unlike Australia and 
other members of the British Commonwealth, Canada was therefore left out of the 
decisions made by the war cabinet because of this decision despite there being two senior 
Canadian Cabinet ministers in London at the time.65  Churchill had reason to believe that 
the war cabinet had the authority to act in the name of the entire British Commonwealth.  
The other dominions were a part of the war cabinet decision making, and Canada’s 
refusal to send a representative meant that it had given up their representation.  The 
October 8 war cabinet meeting was held without any of the dominion representatives 
present, meaning none of the dominions were consulted about Britain’s retaliatory action.  
Churchill later apologized for this oversight and justified it because of the need for 
immediate action.66  Despite this reasoning, the issue was clear: Canada had not been 
consulted on a matter that involved Canadian soldiers and Canada’s participation in the 
shackling of German prisoners of war.   
 Mackenzie King had made it clear that Canada was at Britain’s side at the 
beginning of the war, but as an independent nation.  As was evident from Mackenzie 
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King’s desire to be included alongside Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Canadian 
prime minister did not intend to act as a subordinate to the British or American leaders. 67  
Canada was often disregarded when it came to Allied decisions because Roosevelt and 
Churchill considered Canada to be a secondary power that followed Britain’s lead.  This 
infuriated Mackenzie King, who sought to demonstrate Canada’s independence.68  
Britain’s failure to consult the Canadian government before engaging in reprisals was 
even more aggravating. Not only was Canada required to shackle all but two hundred of 
the German prisoners of war that would be shackled in the initial reprisal, but Canadian 
soldiers made up the majority of those prisoner of war shackled by the Germans.69  
Without consultation, Britain had volunteered Canada for a situation that was arguably 
more Canada’s concern than Britain’s in terms of who would be affected. 
 The main dispute between Churchill and Mackenzie King was not the decision to 
respond to German threats with a show of force.  Mackenzie King agreed with 
Churchill’s initial decision to engage in shackling reprisals as a response to the German 
government’s actions, viewing the retaliatory action as a necessary, but regretful, show of 
power.70  Mackenzie King and Churchill were at odds over Canada’s right to have been 
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consulted before being committed to participate in the shackling reprisals.  The Canadian 
cabinet war committee ultimately decided to comply with Britain’s decision in order to 
maintain a united front with Britain.  They had already been committed by Churchill, and 
any move to the contrary would be a public opposition to Britain’s decision.  Mackenzie 
King advised the war committee that they should emphasize to Britain that Canada was 
reluctant to engage in the reprisals.71  This reprimand articulated Mackenzie King’s 
irritation with Churchill’s presumptuous actions and made it clear that such behavior 
would not be tolerated in the future. 
 Mackenzie King understood that Canada and Britain would not be able to outdo 
the Germans in a prolonged war of prisoner of war reprisals.  Mackenzie King’s decision 
to acquiesce to Britain’s decision was not without stipulations for additional action for 
this very reason.  The acceptance of Canada’s role in the initial shackling of German 
prisoners was sent along with a request for Churchill to request the assistance of the 
Swiss government in ending the retaliation and shackling of prisoners of war. 72  In doing 
so, Mackenzie King made a delayed attempt to regain Canada’s authority in the shackling 
reprisals.   
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 The Canadian suggestion to allow the Swiss government to mediate the shackling 
crisis was considered and ultimately rejected by the British war cabinet. The proposed 
mediation could result in having to divulge information about the treatment of German 
prisoners of war that would not be received well by the Germans.73  This reasoning 
suggests a less than appropriate treatment of the German prisoners of war by the British.  
The dubious actions at Dieppe and Sark regarding hand-tying and the deaths of German 
prisoners of war after their capture indicate that Churchill and the war cabinet were 
stretching the boundaries of the 1929 Geneva Convention.  Churchill’s refusal to use a 
Swiss mediator, even after Mackenzie King’s proposal, indicates Churchill’s overall 
perspective of the situation: he would do as he pleased and take advice only if it was 
consistent with his position.  
 At noon on October 10, the shackling of German prisoners of war in Canada and 
Britain began. From 9 a.m. until 9 p.m., 240 German prisoners of war held in Britain had 
their hands shackled with 1-foot chains.  The British-held German prisoners of war had 
been informed of the circumstances prior to the shackling.  Additionally, the highest 
ranking German officer to be involved in the shackling, General Cruwell, ultimately gave 
his consent to being shackled alongside his men, although his eczema prevented him 
from this treatment.74  While shackling in Britain had gone rather smoothly, in part 
because of the consent of the General Cruwell, the shackling of German prisoners of war 
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held in Canada did not go nearly so well.  On October 10, 1,100 German prisoners of war 
were supposed to be placed in shackles by the Canadian government, but only 400 were 
actually put in chains.75  The events surrounding the Canadian shackling differed greatly 
from the compliance in Britain, which added to the difficulties between Mackenzie King 
and Churchill. 
 Mackenzie King faced opposition for participating in the shackling reprisals from 
both the German prisoners of war in Canada and the Canadian public.  A prisoner 
uprising at the Bowmanville prisoner of war camp in southern Ontario, later called the 
Battle of Bowmanville, became the most publicized incident resulting from attempts to 
shackle German prisoners of war.  High-ranking German officers at Bowmanville 
objected to the plan to shackle 100 of the prisoners, which led to a three-day battle where 
four hundred prisoners of war barricaded themselves in one of the prison halls.76  This 
incident was the only significant rebellion and information of the event was effectively 
withheld from the public until late October.  The public response to Canada’s 
involvement in shackling was already negative.  A series of reports by the Globe and 
Mail on October 13 and 14 denounced the shackling of German prisoners of war in 
Canadian custody.  These articles condemned shackling as an act of “aping the depravity 
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of the Nazis beasts and discarding civilization’s conventions.”77  Public opinion deemed 
such behavior unacceptable on moral and political grounds.  Imitating Germany would 
“weaken the high moral position of the United Nations” and engage Canada and Britain 
in a war of reprisals with “Hitler, who murders and destroys even his own people without 
the slightest human compunction.”78  Such conduct was would only result in the 
shackling of more British and Canadian prisoners of war by Germany and the disgrace of 
those involved.  The Canadian public’s discomfort with Canada’s participation in the 
shackling reprisals reflected Mackenzie King’s own unease with the situation.  Public 
opinion and prisoner revolts fueled Mackenzie King’s determination to end Canada’s role 
in the reprisals.  He issued a temporary cease-shackling order after only four hundred 
German prisoners of war were shackled.  He was also determined that the Swiss 
government would be consulted on Canada’s behalf. 
 On October 12, Mackenzie King notified Churchill of the cease-shackling order, 
explaining the public discontent and prisoner revolt in Bowmanville.  On October 13, the 
British war cabinet considered the concerns of the Canadian government regarding the 
initial shackling.  In addition, Churchill brought up Mackenzie King’s request for the 
Swiss government “to ascertain whether Canadian prisoners in German hands had offered 
resistance to the order and whether the Germans had used force in applying it.”79  This 
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request was based on the universal opposition to shackling, but it also represented a 
transition in Mackenzie King’s position on shackling reprisals.  He was not only taking 
affirmative action by ceasing reprisals, but seeking to separate Canadian and British 
power relations and interests.  Churchill and the British war cabinet decided that acting 
upon the Canadian’s request was not in the best interest of the Allies because “it might 
provoke the Germans to make a similar enquiry about the enforcement of the order in this 
country and in Canada.”80  Mackenzie King’s attempt to separate Canada’s interests in 
the shackling reprisals was in vain.  Although Mackenzie King had made significant 
progress in upholding Canadian independence, allowing Churchill to handle mediation 
with the Swiss government meant that Canada remained subjected to Britain’s interests. 
 On October 10, 1942, the German government issued a response to the shackling 
of German prisoners of war in Britain and Canada.  Beginning on October 10, the 
Germans declared that they would implement a three-to-one reprisal policy; for every 
German prisoner of war shackled by Britain, German would shackle three British 
soldiers.81  The German response referenced Britain and Churchill as the belligerents 
carrying out the controversial action but made no reference to either Canada or 
Mackenzie King.  The German government placed heavy emphasis on Churchill’s role in 
the shackling reprisals, describing his reasons to engage in reprisals as “arbitrary and 
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devious,” and having lent “the entire Geneva Convention ad absurdum.”82  Churchill’s 
decisions regarding the prisoner of war reprisals aggravated both his allies and the 
enemy.  It was clear that the situation had become a fight between Britain and Germany, 
perhaps even more so between Hitler and Churchill.  Because Churchill had not made a 
request to the Swiss government on behalf of Mackenzie King, Canada’s interests were 
not being adequately represented.83  It was becoming increasingly clear that Canada’s 
interests would be best served if Mackenzie King acted independently from Churchill. 
 The British government sent an official telegram to the Canadian government 
asking for their agreement to engage in additional reprisals in response to the German’s 
threat of three-to-one shackling.  In order to do so, the British proposed that the Canadian 
government would have to shackle additional prisoners.  A private message from 
Churchill to Mackenzie King followed the official telegram.  Churchill asked the 
Canadian prime minister to “stand by us in this anxious business in which we both have 
much at stake.”84  Mackenzie King had demonstrated that Canada had a significant 
amount of power in the shackling reprisals, and that it was necessary for Churchill to 
consult him as an ally.  Churchill was aware that any retaliatory action by Britain was 
inconsequential without Canadian action, and so then afforded Mackenzie King the 
respect and authority necessary to ensure his participation in the British plan. 
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 The united Canadian-British front against Germany during the shackling reprisals 
was no longer beneficial to Canadian interests.  Mackenzie King’s strategy to end the 
shackling reprisals by actively working towards an unshackling date conflicted with 
Churchill’s position.  The Canadian prime minister believed that Churchill had “bungled 
the whole business terribly” by shrouding the British government’s role in the hand-tying 
at Dieppe in deception and through Churchill’s determination to continue on the 
questionable path of shackling reprisals.85  Churchill’s determination to match the 
German’s threat of three-to-one retaliatory shackling weighed heavily on Mackenzie 
King, who became even more convinced that Canada’s role in the reprisals must end.86  
Continuing the retaliatory shackling was futile, as Germany held the greater number of 
prisoners of war and had continuously shown their brutality.87  Germany responded to 
Churchill’s decision to engage in retaliatory shackling with the implementation of a 
three-to-one reprisal policy, and so Mackenzie King reasoned that Churchill’s current 
path would not end the shackling reprisals.  Canada’s interests would not be advanced if 
Mackenzie King followed Britain on this issue.  
 Mackenzie King decided not to support Churchill if he attempted to match 
Germany’s reprisal threat of three-to-one shackling.  As a result, a standstill ensued as 
neither the Allies nor Germany made a move.  The Canadian government continued to 
propose that the British government seek mediation from the Swiss government and 
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establish a definite plan to end the shackling reprisals.  Churchill, however, was content 
to wait and dismissed Canada’s proposal.  On October 22 Churchill brought up the 
prisoner of war reprisals before the war cabinet.  He addressed the situation as Germany’s 
attempt to “stir up hatred among the German people against us,” to “hamper the 
effectiveness of our Commando raids and of our bombing attacks.”88  As a result, the 
British government engaged only in limited talks with the Swiss government in an effort 
to get information from Germany.  However, Churchill refused to release any information 
about the conditions of the German prisoners of war in Britain and Canada.  He decided 
to wait for the German government to reply to the Swiss government’s inquiries 
regarding prisoners of war in Germany and their attempts at mediating an unshackling 
date.89  On October 23, the British government sent a telegram to the Canadian 
government stating that they would not take any action at the current time. 
 On October 23, the Canadian government made another attempt to reach a 
decision with Britain that would end the shackling reprisals.  Mackenzie King expressed 
his concern for the deterioration of the treatment of prisoners of war following the 
shackling reprisals.  He also proposed a course of action to end the shackling of German 
prisoners of war.90  According to this plan, all governments of the Commonwealth would 
issue a joint public statement addressing the treatment of prisoners of war and also make 
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an appeal to the Swiss government to investigate the German’s treatment of allied 
prisoners of war as hostages.91  Mackenzie King’s proposal relied on the premise that 
Canada, Britain, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand would act as independent 
states.  Unfortunately, the Canadian and British communication regarding their respective 
decisions on the reprisals situation crossed.  The war cabinet decided against the 
immediate action that the Canadian government had suggested, and so Mackenzie King’s 
attempt to end the reprisals fell flat.92  Once again, the British plan was chosen as the 
more prudent. 
 The decision to wait until the Swiss government received information from the 
German government meant that Mackenzie King was no closer to ending Canada’s role 
in the reprisals.  Unfortunately for the Canadians, that decision did not produce any 
immediate results.  Adding insult to injury, High Commissioner Vincent Massey 
informed Mackenzie King that Churchill’s decisions regarding the shackling reprisals 
were met with widespread disapproval in Britain because he took a “less serious view of 
the implications and consequences of the situation than [was] held by the majority of 
people, officials and otherwise, almost all whom regard the present position with the 
greatest disquietude.”93  Mackenzie King was exasperated by Churchill’s position.  He 
viewed the situation as one of Canada’s most vital interests and responded accordingly.  
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Churchill however had continually deferred making a decision, preferring to play a 
waiting game with the German government.  Mackenzie King’s decisive telegram on 
October 23 had come to nothing and the standstill continued into November.   
 In November, new considerations concerning the prisoner of war shackling 
reprisals drove Mackenzie King to take another stand.  The shackling was believed to 
have a “serious effect on the mental and physical health of the prisoners” and trust within 
the international community.94  Mackenzie King felt international pressure as the 
shackling reprisals continued into November, and he responded by making another 
attempt to find a solution.  The Canadian government had deferentially followed Britain’s 
policies but with no success.  On November 3, Mackenzie King proposed that the 
shackled German prisoners of war in Canadian and British custody be unshackled on 
November 10 without consulting the Swiss government.95  There had been no word from 
the German government since October 10 on the shackling reprisals, which made 
Churchill’s plan increasingly impractical.  Mackenzie King’s newest proposal to end the 
shackling crisis required action, rather than a continuing impasse.  The British 
government needed to back down from their current stalemate with Germany.  Churchill, 
however, was not ready to accept Canada’s newest proposal. 
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 Negotiations with Churchill continued to stall Mackenzie King’s plan of ending 
Canada’s participation in the shackling reprisals.  On November 4, Churchill responded 
to Mackenzie King’s proposal that Britain and Canada should unshackle their German 
prisoners of war on November 10.  Churchill asked the Canadian prime minister “not [to] 
press me too hard about these 400 prisoners whom you can tie up as loosely as you 
please.”96  He urged Mackenzie King to continue to be patient.  Churchill believed that 
backing down would be a sign of weakness.  He told Mackenzie King that it would be “a 
thousand pities to give in to this bully and make a failure of it at this juncture.  Such an 
advertised surrender might well lead to a prolongation of these indignities on your men 
and ours.”97  Churchill’s policy had not changed since the initial declaration on October 8 
in retaliation against Germany’s decision to shackle British and Canadian prisoners of 
war. Taking the initiative, as Mackenzie King wished to do, would mean admitting that it 
had been a mistake to engage in the reprisals.  However, Churchill could no longer 
dismiss the Canadian government’s concerns since doing so incited Mackenzie King to 
take the initiative.  Churchill’s telegram appealed Mackenzie King’s desire to be viewed 
as a fellow leader with whom the British prime minister shared plans.  The Canadian 
government did not unshackle their German prisoners of war on November 10 and 
Churchill maintained British control over the shackling reprisals. 
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 Allied victories in Egypt resulted in the capture of a significant number of 
German soldiers.  The British and Canadian prime ministers believed that this large 
number of German prisoners of war could be used to their benefit in the shackling 
reprisals.  Churchill reasoned that the combination of military victories and capture of 
additional German soldiers could be used as leverage against the German government.98  
Surely the German government would be forced to answer the Swiss government’s 
appeals for mediation.  Mackenzie King contended that because the successes in Egypt 
placed Britain in a position of power, the allies would be able to initiate unshackling 
without being perceived as weak.99  He believed that Britain had the leverage to end the 
shackling reprisals with Germany.  On November 20, Mackenzie King proposed this new 
course of action to the British government, stating that now was the ideal time to 
unshackle the German prisoners of war in Britain and Canada.100  However, the situation 
in Britain remained “as unsatisfactory as ever… [I]t now appears that nothing at all has 
been done except to enquire of the Swiss how the matter stands.”101 Once again, the plan 
of pursuing independent action was set aside in favor of waiting for the Swiss 
government to mediate the reprisals.   
 On November 24, the German government replied to the Swiss government on 
the issue of the unshackling of prisoners of war in Britain, Germany, and Canada.  The 
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German government set forth a series of terms that must be met before they would agree 
to end their shackling of allied prisoners.  In particular, Britain must issue “to its troops 
an entirely categorical and general order forbidding under severe penalties any binding 
(Fesselung) of prisoners of war and also possession of bonds (Fesseln) for the purpose 
[of shackling prisoners of war].”102  In the meantime, on November 30 the Canadian war 
committee had decided to “communicate directly with the Swiss government to the effect 
that if they extended an invitation to both sides to unshackle, Canada would comply 
unconditionally” once they received notice from the German government.103  Upon 
receiving the German’s conditions, it was clear that this decision would end Canada’s 
participation in the shackling crisis, but it would not have an impact on the Canadian 
prisoners of war shackled in Germany.  The end of the shackling crisis would require 
Churchill’s cooperation. 
 Mackenzie King decided that it was necessary to unshackle the German prisoners 
of war in Canadian custody to demonstrate its independence from Britain in the shackling 
reprisals.  Doing so would at least end Canada’s participation in the unsavory situation.  
At the very best, it would force the German government to consider Canada as a separate 
actor in the reprisals.  The Canadian government considered two courses of action.  The 
first was to approach the Swiss government directly and the second was to unshackle 
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German prisoners of war in Canada regardless of what Britain and Germany did.104  On 
December 3, the British war cabinet considered the new developments, including 
Mackenzie King’s decision to act independently and end shackling in Canada.  The war 
cabinet decided to request mediation from the Swiss government, which would include 
setting a date and time for a mutual unshackling by the Allies and Germany.105  
Churchill’s acquiescence to mediation included an irritated reference to the unacceptable 
behavior of the Canadians because they were forcing Britain to act with Canada, and not 
vice versa as had been the case before.106  Mackenzie King had finally gained the upper 
hand in this policy confrontation with Britain. 
 In December, Mackenzie King strengthened his position on the shackling 
reprisals.  He arranged to have the Swiss government communicate directly with him so 
that Canada did not have to rely on Britain for information.  As a result, the Canadian 
government gained recognition as a principal player in the shackling controversy.107  On 
December 7, the Swiss government revealed their current plan to end the shackling 
reprisals.  The Germans intended to unshackle all British and Canadian prisoners of war 
during the Christmas week, so the Swiss government proposed that a temporary but 
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universal Christmas unshackling occur on December 14.108  Churchill and Mackenzie 
King agreed to this turn of events because it satisfied both their interests.  Churchill had 
the Swiss government mediation that he had been waiting for, and Mackenzie King was 
able to go along with the planned unshackling of German prisoners of war held in Canada 
while retaining unity with Britain.109 
 
The United States, Fall 1942 
 
 
 The United States’ involvement during the first stage of the shackling reprisals, 
during which Canada and Britain engaged in shackling, was that of a disapproving ally 
who was largely unattached to the situation.  Unlike Canada and Britain, nations with 
active roles in the engagement of retaliatory measures against prisoners of war and in 
diplomatic relations over the incident, the United States had not been confronted by the 
Germans regarding their handling of prisoners of war, and therefore was not a belligerent 
in the shackling reprisals.  However, the importance of the United States and President 
Roosevelt during this time cannot be overlooked.  President Roosevelt’s opinion of the 
shackling matter was that the act of hand-tying on the battlefield was allowable under the 
Geneva Convention, but the retaliation against prisoners of war on both sides was 
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unacceptable.110  It was in the United States’ best interests to assist in negotiating the 
shackling reprisals because of its emerging prisoner of war diplomatic relationship with 
Germany.111  Roosevelt’s actions influenced Churchill and Mackenzie King in their 
decisions and pushed the United States forward as the primary power among the Allies.  
His engagement during the fall of 1942 reflected the United States’ continuously growing 
status as an Ally during the Second World War as he gradually became a greater 
influence in prisoner of war relations with Germany and the United States became more 
entrenched in the European and African fronts. 112  President Roosevelt’s engagement 
with Prime Minister Churchill and Prime Minister Mackenzie King regarding the 
shackling crisis reflected the concerns of the United States and the potential effects of the 
shackling reprisals on his country. 
 President Roosevelt’s interest in the shackling reprisals began unofficially with its 
support of Britain and opposition of Germany prior to Pearl Harbor and strengthened as 
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the United States entered the Second World War as a member of the Allies.  The United 
States’ investment in the shackling reprisals went beyond that of Britain and Canada’s 
ally because the crisis had a potential impact on the United States’ growing military 
involvement in the direct fight with Germany.113  The immediate concern was for the 
treatment of United States citizens in German hands as prisoners of war.  The capture of 
four United States Rangers during the Dieppe Raid commenced the U.S.-German 
prisoner of war diplomacy during the Second World War.  Although Germany did not 
direct their attention to the United States in regards to the shackling orders, their 
relationship with the United States regarding prisoners of war would no doubt be 
impacted by the shackling crisis.  The inconvenient timing of the United States’ entrance 
into prisoner of war diplomacy with Germany meant that the four American prisoners of 
war could be directly affected, either by being shackled alongside their British and 
Canadian counterparts of the Dieppe Raid or through less than legitimate treatment in 
captivity.  Even more concerning still for Roosevelt was the impact the shackling crisis 
may have on the treatment of American prisoners of war in the future. 
 Looking ahead, Roosevelt had undeniable reason for concern regarding the 
shackling crisis’ impact on the United States and its future prisoners of war in German 
hands.  In addition to the concern for those four Americans taken prisoner at Dieppe, the 
United States was on the verge of an even greater prisoner of war possibility.  In 
November 1942, American soldiers began fighting in North Africa, thus exponentially 
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increasing the possibility of Germany taking American prisoners of war.114  With the plan 
in place for the British, Canadian, and American military effort in North Africa, President 
Roosevelt was well aware of the potential for American forces to be taken prisoner by 
Germany at the beginning of the shackling reprisals.  If the shackling crisis continued to 
the point where Germany ran out of British and Canadian soldiers to shackle, they may 
very well begin to shackle American prisoners of war in order to continue the retaliation. 
Once Germany announced that the nationality of prisoners of war would not bar them 
from retaliatory acts the concern for American soldiers became real.115  Once Japan and 
Italy threatened to carry out reprisals against Allied prisoners, the United States’ interest 
in the shackling reprisals increased exponentially, as did the number of American soldiers 
who were potentially affected by the incident.116  President Roosevelt faced the threat of 
United States prisoners of war being shackled because of Britain and Canada’s 
involvement in the shackling reprisals, and thus his interest in ending the shackling 
reprisals and restoring the Geneva Convention’s principles grew. 
 Roosevelt had to consider the immediate as well as the potential effects of the 
shackling reprisals on United States prisoners of war and the United States.  In the 
summer of 1942, the United States agreed to hold between 150,000 and 175,000 of 
Britain’s prisoners of war, whom would be transported to the United States later in the 
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war.117  Should the shackling reprisals continue on to a point where the number of 
German prisoners of war shackled exceeded the number held by Britain and its 
dominions, there was the possibility that the United States would be asked to participate 
in the venture and engage in shackling. The United States would have had the option of 
refusing because they were the detaining power, just as Canada did in the fall of 1943.   
Even so, the United States would have undoubtedly seen negative diplomatic effects as 
the detaining power of so many German prisoners of war while Britain and Canada 
continued to engage in reprisals.  In addition, it would create an uncomfortable situation 
between Britain and the United States, which would be viewed as a power struggle by 
allies and enemies alike.  Roosevelt faced the complicated question of what to do in the 
midst of the shackling reprisals.  His actions, complicated enormously by the fact that the 
United States was only potentially impacted, reflected the issues the United States faced 
as a non-belligerent Ally in the shackling reprisals. 
 Roosevelt’s opinion on the situation Britain had dragged the Allies into was made 
evident in a public manner on October 23, when he expressed the United States’ concerns 
with the potential effects of the shackling reprisals: the United States would not engage in 
reprisals as it was against the laws of the Geneva Convention.118  In a private 
conversation with Mackenzie King, recorded in the latter’s diary, Roosevelt “said that 
Winston [Churchill] was inclined at times to take things a little too quickly in hand 
                                                 
117
 Thompson, Men in German Uniform, 6. 
 
118
 Roosevelt, “October 23, 1942 Press Conference,” in Complete Presidential Press Conferences, 173; 
Ibid. 
 
55 
 
 
 
himself.”119  Publically and privately against the British decision to engage in shackling 
and the bilateral retaliatory shackling, Roosevelt placed himself in the position that 
Mackenzie King had wished to take by upholding international law and avoiding 
engagement in questionable practices towards prisoners of war.  His relationship with 
Britain and Canada in regards to prisoner of war diplomacy was a reflection of the power 
status of the United States as the war continued: independent.  The United States 
distanced itself from the illegal retaliatory shackling in protection of international 
regulations and its own interests.  As a result, it maintained an inactive role in prisoner of 
war diplomatic relations during the initial stage of the shackling reprisals. 
 The initial stage of diplomacy during the shackling reprisals reflected the 
individual nature of each nation and the separate of interests of Britain, Canada, and the 
United States in prisoner of war diplomacy with Germany.  Britain and Canada’s 
participation in the retaliatory shackling of prisoners of war and their respective positions 
on this action estranged them from the United States and each other.  Once Britain and 
Canada untangled themselves from the shackling practice, the nations could work jointly 
to rein in Germany to the policies of the Geneva Convention.  The diplomatic 
relationship between Britain, Canada, and the United States in 1943 reflected a collective 
Allied policy and their increased cooperation in the shackling reprisals.
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Chapter 4 
 
1943, Unshackled 
 
 
 
 On December 12, 1942, German prisoners of war in Canada and Britain were 
released from their shackles.  This unshackling would be permanent, whereas the British 
and Canadian prisoners of war in Germany were returned to their shackles on December 
26, 1942.  Mackenzie King had succeeded in freeing Canada from the political nightmare 
of the shackling reprisals, even though Canadian prisoners of war would not be 
unshackled until December 1943.  The release of German prisoners of war from their 
shackles was only half of a solution to the shackling reprisals.  After the universal 
Christmas unshackling, Germany once again shackled its Allied prisoners of war and 
“maintained its refusal to unshackle unless the Allies gave a “categorical and general 
order” forbidding the binding of prisoners of war.”120  The prisoner of war diplomacy 
with Germany over the shackling of Allied prisoners of war ceased to be a major focus in 
international wartime diplomacy.  Free from the illegal reprisal situation, the Canadian 
and British governments were once again in a position to collaborate with the United 
States in their diplomatic relations with Germany.  However, the conflict for the Allies 
was far from over.  From January 1943 until the unshackling of Allied prisoners of war in 
November 1943, Churchill, Mackenzie King, and Roosevelt struggled to come to an 
agreement as Allies that would satisfy the German government. 
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 With German prisoners of war released from their shackles, the shackling 
reprisals became largely a one-sided matter as the Allies sought to gain the freedom of 
their prisoners of war shackled by Germany.  Germany, adamant that the practice of tying 
prisoners’ hands on or off the battlefield was a violation of the Geneva Convention, 
refused to untie its Allied prisoners of war until the Allies (notably not just Britain) 
issued an order that completely and categorically forbade any form of shackling or tying 
prisoners of war under severe penalty before Allied prisoners of war would be released 
from their shackles.121  Although the United States, Canada, and Britain had come to an 
agreement that prisoners of war would not be shackled off of the battlefield, they were 
not at an agreement regarding the conditional situations of tying prisoners’ hands in 
conflict, and so could not present the German government with an acceptable statement 
that would release Allied prisoners of war from their shackles.  The legality of battlefield 
conditions for prisoners of war became the point of contention not only between the 
Allies and Germany, but among the Allies as well.  
 Churchill, in agreement with British cabinet and war cabinet, refused to order a 
cessation of the practice of tying prisoners’ hands on the battlefield.122  The British 
government informed the Protecting Power that the act of shackling would only be used 
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“when particular operations conditions make it essential in the interests of the safety of 
the prisoner and when any other action would be less humane.” 123  The hand-tying, then, 
was to be considered as a last-resort measure where otherwise prisoners may be harmed 
in an attempt to prevent their escape during battle.  Hitler rejected the British declaration 
and accused Britain and Canada of continuing to allow violations of the Geneva 
Convention. 124  Once again, the British-Canadian situation was being dictated by 
Churchill and the British government.  The situation, however, was alleviated slightly by 
the fact that the governments were no longer engaged in illegal or uncertain activities 
(other than the allowance of the tying of prisoners’ hands on the field).  The shackling 
reprisals and the immediate illegality now lay solely on Germany, as the allegations 
against Britain, Canada, and any Ally of a like mindset were purely based on policy and 
not direct action at this point.  In January, the British government drafted their stance on 
the shackling of prisoners of war and began the draft negotiations with Canada as to what 
their official statement to the Protecting Power would be.   
His Majesty’s Government desires to point out to Swiss Government that 
whatever allegations German Government may make as to action taken by 
British soldiers in the field of battle, these can provide no possible 
justification for manacling of British prisoners of war in the hands of the 
German Government.  Under Article 2 of International convention relative 
to treatment of prisoners of war, the treatment of such prisoners as 
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hostages and their subjection to measures of reprisal is expressly 
forbidden.125  
  
This position reaffirmed Britain’s declaration that the tying of prisoners’ hands on the 
field of battle was not official policy and Britain had never created a general order of that 
kind.  However, Britain maintained that “such a process might indeed be in the best 
interests of safety of prisoners themselves,” and so they would not agree with Germany’s 
position.126  In another draft, Britain elaborated upon the actions taken by their 
government and military as well as their stance on the shackling issue.  The British 
government ensured that “all ranks shall be acquainted with and observe the terms of the 
Convention with particular reference to treatment of prisoners of war immediately after 
capture.  In these orders the general binding of prisoners of war is strictly forbidden.”127  
Thus, the regulations in place were in accordance with Germany’s demands and may 
have resulted in the end of the shackling of Allied prisoners of war in January.  However, 
the draft continued in such a manner—meant to defend the actions previously taken by 
British and Canadian soldiers as well as the decisions of the British government during 
Dieppe and Sark—that a policy conflict with Germany would be continued. 
Attention, however, is called to the following consideration.  It is the duty 
of a prisoner of war during operations to escape or to impede his captors if 
he can do so.  It is equally the duty of every soldier to prevent any such 
action by a prisoner of war who may be in his keeping during operations.  
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In fulfillment of this duty special measures of restraint, such as the binding 
of prisoners, may be adopted if the operational conditions make it essential 
but measures must be carried out in a humane manner and as soon as the 
emergency which necessitated them is over they must be at once 
discontinued.128  
 
Military authorities, including Canadian Generals Stuart and McNaughton, concurred 
with the British position of allowing prisoners’ hands to be tied on the field if necessary.  
With the apparent need for hand-tying to be allowed in special circumstances, it was 
“obviously impossible to give the categorical undertaking required by the Germans.”129  
The issue was putting it in writing, which the British and Canadian governments 
proceeded to discuss into February. 
 Britain and Canada strove to create a reply to the Swiss government and a 
resolution for the shackling reprisals in February 1943.  Churchill and Mackenzie King 
submitted drafts and revisions to one another throughout this time period in an attempt to 
create a statement that would maintain their united position while also working towards 
an understanding that would release Allied prisoners of war in Germany from their 
shackles.  The effort towards a joint declaration by Britain and Canada to the Swiss 
government demonstrated the development of Allied prisoner of war diplomacy since the 
beginning of the shackling reprisals in October 1942.130  However, while the British-
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Canadian joint effort progressed upon relatively good terms, their efforts faced the wall 
of German determination and interpretation.   
 The effort to free Allied prisoners of war in Germany went hand-in-hand with the 
greater attempt to keep Germany obedient to the regulations of the Geneva Convention.  
To do so, it was necessary to convince them that the Allies intended to follow the 
convention themselves and that their policies reflected international law.  Churchill and 
Mackenzie King fought to explain that the Allies’ shackling policy was based on the idea 
that the Geneva Convention’s regulations on the treatment of prisoners of war “does not 
attempt to regulate what happens in the actual fighting,” whereas Germany interpreted 
the allowance of shackling as the understanding that the Geneva Convention was not 
binding in the battlefield.131  The subject of the draft revisions was how to accomplish 
this and how to phrase the British and Canadian policy in an agreeable and productive 
manner.132  Thus, the official statement eventually read: 
The binding of prisoners in fulfillment of this duty will only be 
countenanced when particular operational conditions make it essential in 
the interests of the safety of the prisoner and when any other action would 
be less humane: such measures must be carried out in a humane manner 
and must be at once discontinued immediately they are no longer required 
to prevent the prisoner’s escape.133 
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However, Hitler’s engagement in the prisoner of war diplomacy over the shackling 
reprisals remained steadfast.  Allied prisoners of war in German hands remained in 
shackles and, even more daunting, Hitler was becoming less inclined to follow the 
Geneva protocols towards those prisoners of war in German hands.  Germany and Japan 
were “beginning to make of the situation one that treats prisoners as hostages,” rather 
than captured enemy soldiers in 1943.134  In order to pull Germany back to the regulations 
of the Geneva Convention, Britain and Canada faced the possibility of having to comply 
with Hitler’s will.   
 On March 31, 1943, Mackenzie King’s diary entry reflected the unfavorable 
stance that the Allies found themselves in regards to the shackling crisis.  “On 
shackling…we felt we should give full undertaking to Germans as to no shackling 
hereafter—leave them nothing to complain of.  It might mean that men might be shot 
instead of shackled.”135  To Allied leaders, it appeared that Germany would gain a de 
facto ‘win’ in the battle over shackling as the Allies fought to maintain the Geneva 
Convention on both sides.  As imminent as that possibility may have seemed, however, 
Germany’s stance in the shackling reprisals was weaker than it appeared.  Between 
November 1942 and March 1943, over 100,000 German soldiers were taken as prisoners 
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of war by the Allies in North Africa, thus creating a more even balance of prisoners of 
war held by each side.136  Germany had the welfare of their own captured soldiers to 
consider and Hitler faced contention from his government, who feared that the shackling 
policy would prevent the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war.137  Although 
the reality of the shackling of Allied prisoners of war was much more lenient than the 
official German policy and shackling was a symbolic rather than an actual practice, 
Hitler’s threat to Allied prisoners of war remained.  
 Churchill and Mackenzie King faced a new set of issues in negotiating the end of 
the shackling reprisals as the German threat to Allied prisoners of war ceased.  In April 
the British government decided to pursue an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of 
war with Germany in response to the latters’ efforts in that direction, creating a sense of 
security towards the treatment of prisoners of war.138  Although the news that the 
treatment of Allied prisoners in Germany was better than German policy dictated due to 
the efforts of camp commandants, Churchill and Mackenzie King faced the issue of 
keeping the shackling issue a priority in wartime diplomacy and efforts.139  The Allies 
sought to ease the concern of families at home, but revealing that Germany did not 
enforce their shackling policy would take away from the greater concern of Germany 
upholding the Geneva Convention in addition to possibly alerting the German 
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government of leniency in prisoner of war camps.140  Although Germany progressed 
towards the better treatment of prisoners of war, Hitler’s policy on shackling stood fast 
and maintained a standstill. 
 In May, Allied successes in North Africa resulted in a progression in the 
shackling reprisals.  On May 9, the Allies achieved a complete defeat of the Axis forces 
in North Africa with the unconditional surrender in northern Tunisia.  Just as had 
occurred in the fall of 1942, the success in the spring of 1943 gave the Allies leverage in 
the shackling reprisals through increased numbers of German prisoners of war.141  The 
number of German prisoners of war in British hands increased from 33,315 on April 15, 
1943 to 142,315 on May 9, 1943.142  In comparison, Germany held approximately 80,000 
British [including Dominions] prisoners of war. 143  With the overwhelming number of 
German prisoners of war taken from the North African campaign, the United States was 
forced to accept responsibility for them per their 1942 agreement with Britain.  With this 
substantial development and leverage, the Allies sought to gain the upper hand and force 
Germany’s hand in the shackling policy crisis. 
 The United States’ role in the shackling reprisals became much more apparent 
with the successes in North Africa in 1943.  In the plans for the European front in 1942, a 
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compromise between Churchill and Roosevelt’s plans for the defeat of Germany 
scheduled the 1943 attack of Italy and an assault on German forces in mainland Europe in 
1944.144  As a result, the European and North African theatres of war the British and 
United States’ armies “fought as one,” unlike in any other theatre.145  The success of the 
American forces in North Africa demonstrated their vital contribution to the Allied war 
effort, fully integrating them into the conflict and, with the African threats completed, 
creating the European front.  As American forces prepared for the fight in Europe, the 
United States’ prisoner of war diplomacy with Germany became real.  As the American 
war effort “grew larger in relation to that of the British,” they became a contending power 
within the Allies, making their involvement in the shackling reprisals not only obvious, 
but essential as well.146  The capture of German soldiers in North Africa substantially 
increased the United States’ interest in the shackling reprisals as well. 
 In the fall of 1942 Canada held the majority of German prisoners of war among 
the Allies, but the defeat of Germany in North Africa resulted with the majority of the 
Allies’ German prisoners of war held in the United States.  The captured German Afrika 
Korps, numbering at about 130,000, were sent to the United States.147  With this vast 
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influx of prisoners of war, the United States jumped ahead of the other Allies in terms of 
the number of German prisoners of war held.  This sudden change in relative numbers of 
German prisoners of war, the United States’ importance in prisoner of war diplomacy 
with Germany increased.  Combined with its increased military importance in the 
European/North African Theatres, the prisoner of war increase made the United States 
even more of a contending political power among the Allies.148  Roosevelt’s interest in 
keeping Germany true to the Geneva Convention and his increased influence in Europe 
made the shackling reprisals an even greater concern. 
 The increased number of German prisoners of war in Allied hands did little to 
sway Hitler.  At the end of June, the Swiss government reported that Hitler personally 
insisted on maintaining the shackling of Allied prisoners of war despite the frequent 
arguments against such a measure.149  A stalemate ensued, as neither the Allies nor 
Germany was willing to compromise any further on their positions.  Late in July, 
Churchill suggested threatening Germany with a statement declaring that  
A careful record will be kept of the total number of man-days on which 
British and Canadian prisoners are chained, and that [the Allies] will 
require double this number of man-days to be served in chains by the 
Officer Corps of the German Army after the defeat and surrender of 
Germany has been achieved.150 
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Although Churchill’s position would have been supported by the North African victory 
and the July 10, 1943 invasion of Sicily, his decision was not supported by his own 
government because of the knowledge that shackling was largely symbolic and ceased to 
be a hardship on Allied prisoners of war.151  The War Office, reflecting the Swiss and 
Allied prisoner of war position, acknowledged that such a threat might cause Germany to 
resume a more stringent policy on shackling.  Unless Germany bowed to the threat, it was 
evident that harsher measures and “the effect on men who have been subject to this 
inhuman measure since October 1942 and the consequent reaction on public opinion here 
and in the dominions might well be serious.”152  Finally, in mid-September a 
comprehensive report on the state of Allied prisoners of war arrived that confirmed the 
reasonability of the current inaction.153  Because the prisoners of war affected by the 
shackling order were being treated well, the Allies would not take offensive action. 
 In August, the Swiss government provided the belligerents with a new initiative 
for ending the shackling crisis, believing that the time had come for such a move.  In an 
“unofficial suggestion” to the German Foreign Office, the Marcel Pilet-Golaz, Swiss 
ambassador at Berlin, discussed how ending shackling would positively affect the 
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treatment of both sides’ prisoners of war and facilitate exchange negotiations.154  In order 
to do so, the Germans did not need to formally declare their moves and could instead 
have the Swiss minister report the cessation of shackling to the Allies.155  The German 
foreign ministers favored this suggestion, but held out over the possible issue of Britain 
and Canada tying the hands of German prisoners of war.156  Britain sent a request that the 
shackling be carried out by rotation as alleviation for the prisoners of war affected while 
Germany considered the Swiss proposal, but it was denied.157  However, late in October 
the first successful mutual exchange of seriously wounded and sick prisoners of war took 
place with the exchange of 5,765 German and 5,195 British prisoners of war.158  With the 
success of the exchange, the German government decided at last on the matter of the 
shackling crisis.  On November 22, 1943, the Germans agreed to unshackle Allied 
prisoners of war on terms that the decision was given a low profile and that they would 
not formally rescind the original order. 159  Fearing that Germany may decide to resume 
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shackling, the Allies acquiesced and did not give the issue any more publicity.160  
Without a great deal of publicity, the matter of the shackling reprisals faded. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 The quiet resolution of the shackling reprisals contrasted the ostentatious manner 
that they had begun in October 1942, with the loud declarations and threats between 
heads of states.  This in itself confirmed that the shackling reprisals were less about the 
matter of shackling prisoners of war than it was a power struggle between Britain and 
Germany, and even more so between Churchill and Hitler.  For Hitler and Churchill, the 
matter of their prisoners of war seems to have come in second to national pride, meaning 
that “approximately 4,000 British POWs had to endure being manacled for more than a 
year.”161  The importance of proper treatment for prisoners of war and the upholding of 
the Geneva Convention and international diplomacy during the war were a higher priority 
for Mackenzie King and Roosevelt, although neither leader nor nation could claim 
complete selflessness of political and wartime aims.  Altogether, concern for the well-
being of prisoners of war was superseded by the greater wartime aims and power 
struggles.  Once the Allied shackling of prisoners of war ceased at the end of 1942, the 
conflict among the United States, Britain, and Canada decreased substantially.  Although 
the shackling policy contention’s importance lessened in comparison to greater wartime 
objectives, the growing number of Allied soldiers in German hands ensured Britain, 
Canada, and the United States’ increased interest in the diplomatic relations of 1943.  
Prisoners of war were best represented by the Protecting Power, Switzerland, whose 
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interest in maintaining the Geneva Convention was not hindered by one leaders’ 
individual mindset, as was especially the case for Britain and Germany.162   
 For the United States, the shackling reprisals signified the type of prisoner of war 
diplomacy that may be in their future while at war with Germany.  The nature of Allied 
relations with Germany from 1942-43 would undoubtedly influence future relations 
during the war for the United States as it increased its presence and involvement 
specifically in the North African and European Theatres.  Roosevelt would have had to 
view the shackling crisis as a precedent of prisoner of war diplomacy for the United 
States as the nation became increasingly prominent in the war.  Much like the status of 
the United States in entering the war, its role in the shackling reprisals was very 
individualistic and subdued.  As a non-belligerent in the shackling reprisals, the United 
States was able to usher Britain and Canada as they sought to resolve the issue.  Britain 
and Canada’s roles in the shackling reprisals were heavily influenced on individual 
action, as evident from the Mackenzie King-Churchill relationship dynamics in 1942.  
Prisoner of war diplomacy between the United States, Britain, and Canada during the 
shackling reprisals reflected the individual nations’ relationship dynamics, individual 
concerns, and leaders’ personal policies.  Had the international precedents outlined in 
international regulations been utilized, at least the inter-Allied conflict could have been 
avoided during the shackling incident. 
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 The degree to which Britain, Canada, and the United States engaged in prisoner of 
war diplomacy during the shackling reprisals reflected the relationships between 
governments and that of each government with the Allied war effort at the time.  At the 
head of diplomatic relations with Germany through the Protecting Power, Churchill and 
Britain assumed a sole leadership role in October 1942 that it was reluctant to give up, 
especially to its dominion Canadian government under Mackenzie King.  The battle of 
wills that ensued over the method of ending the shackling reprisals was as representative 
of Britain and Canada’s greater relationship as it was of Mackenzie King and Churchill’s 
personal/political relationship.  The same can be said of Roosevelt and the United States, 
for whom the shackling reprisals represented the first prisoner of war crisis with 
Germany during the Second World War.  The United States was not directly involved 
except for the possibilities that the shackling reprisals represented for the future of 
relations with Germany, which dictated Roosevelt’s removal from the situation.  In 
addition, as the newcomer to the Allies, the United States has little interest in interfering 
in the British-Canadian-German situation unless it directly involved them.  Although the 
United States remained a side-line player during the diplomacy of the shackling reprisals, 
their newness to the war effort as a whole must be considered, after which the significant 
of their role is revealed.  The triumvirate of Allies involved in the shackling reprisals had 
varying degrees of influence and concern for the prisoner of war diplomacy, reflecting 
the complexity of prisoner of war policy in Allied countries and its reliance on individual 
leaders and nations. 
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 On August 12, 1949, the Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War established an updated international protocol for the treatment of prisoner of war.  
Among the updates to the 1929 convention, the protocol on the humane treatment of 
prisoners of war was revised to state:  
Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated.  Any unlawful act 
or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously 
endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, 
and will be regarded as a serious breach of the present Convention.  In 
particular, no prisoner of war may be subjected to physical mutilation or to 
medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are not justified by 
the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the prisoner concerned and 
carried out in his interest.  Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be 
protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against 
insults and public curiosity.  Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war 
are prohibited.163 
 
The shackling reprisals represented one of the many considerations that led to the 
revision of international prisoner of war policy and diplomatic regulations at the 1949 
Geneva Convention. The interplay of diplomacy between the United States, Britain, and 
Canada from 1942-43 signified the reliance of prisoner of war policy on the individual 
interests, leaders, and governments of each nation during the Second World War.  The 
treatment of prisoners of war during the shackling reprisals was subject to national ideals 
and concerns, reflecting the frailty and dependence of prisoners of war and prisoner of 
war policy on individuals, individual nations, and international diplomacy.  Although 
protection existed in the form of the international regulations in the 1929 Geneva 
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 Article 13, 1949 Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of war; August 12, 
1949, accessed January 14, 2014, http://www.icrc.org. 
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Convention, the shackling reprisals demonstrate the weakness of the system in its 
reliance on individual cooperation. 
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